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2.1. Introduction  
In this chapter, we investigate the evolution of ownership structure and corporate governance in Japanese 
firms based on the entire population of listed firms from 1962 to 2012. Ownership structure is one of the 
main corporate governance mechanisms, and many prior studies focus on the characteristics of the 
ownership structure of Japanese firms (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002; Gedajlovic, Yoshikawa, and 
Hashimoto, 2005; Lichtenberg and Pushner, 1994; Prowse, 1992; Yoshikawa and Phan, 2003). The 
concepts of stable shareholding and cross-shareholding represent the traditional ownership structure, and 
the bank-centered financial system or main bank system has been perceived as the conventional corporate 
governance framework in the Japanese firm system (Ahmadjian and Okumura, 2005; Ahmadjian and 
Robinson, 2001; Berglof and Perotti, 1994; Gerlach, 1992; Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1990; Kang 
and Shivdasani, 1995; Morck and Nakamura, 1999; Sheard, 1994). Although prior studies examine this 
topic, there has not been much focus on the evolution of ownership structure and corporate governance in 
Japanese firms from a long-term perspective and with the entire firm population. We aim to address these 
gaps by analyzing the evolution of ownership structure using the entire population of listed firms with 
longitudinal data.  
Our main purpose is to provide the big picture of the evolution of ownership structure and corporate 
governance in Japanese firms so that we can better understand how the Japanese firm system has evolved 
over time. Most previous research touches on this topic by using limited samples of firms (for example, 
the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the manufacturing industry, etc.) and some specific time 
span depending on data availability. This approach is useful when researchers handle specific research 
questions. However, such an approach will not allow us to understand the evolution of the Japanese firm 
system from a historical viewpoint. Thus, we address this issue by using the entire population of listed 
firms with the 50-year time span from 1962 to 2012.  
In addition, we aim to investigate the impacts of the major external (both global and domestic) shocks that 
may have driven significant changes in ownership structure and corporate governance. Prior research that 
examines the impact of external shocks usually looks at a single event, such as the Asian Financial Crisis 
(Baek, Kang, and Park, 2004; Joh, 2003; Johnson et al., 2000; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Mitton, 2002). 
Instead, we will investigate the impact of all major events that took place from the 1970s to the present. 
By so doing, we will be able to show that each shock is situated in a specific time period and that hence 
each has a varying impact on firm systems in Japan. One of the key implications of our study is that we 
will be able to provide insights on how much Japanese corporate governance has shifted and where it is 
heading given the changes in ownership structure driven by major environmental changes.  
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2.2. Sample and data  
We rely on several databases to collect our data for this study. We use the DBJ (Development Bank of 
Japan) database for ownership and financial data. This database contains the 10 largest shareholders list 
and their shareholding ratios from 1981 to present.1 We also use the ownership and board database 2012, 
developed by the Center for Economic Institutions in the Hitotsubashi University for the pre-1981 
period.2 This database provides the 10 largest shareholders list and their shareholding ratios before 1981. 
By combining these two databases, we will be able to trace the evolution of ownership structure of 
Japanese firms from 1962 to 2012. To capture the ownership evolution in Japanese firms, we classify the 
10 largest shareholders into 10 categories: bank, insurance, securities, corporate, other financial company 
(including venture capital), individual, employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), foreign investor, 
foundation, and others.  
As the main purpose of our study is to provide the big picture of the evolution of ownership structure and 
corporate governance in Japanese firms, we do not present results for each of the 10 categories because 
the portions of some categories are not high and do not show much evolution or fluctuations by year. We 
instead combine bank, insurance company, and securities company into one category, and we call this 
group “financial ownership.” Financial ownership is thus measured as the ratio of shareholdings by banks, 
insurance companies, and securities companies that are among a firm’s 10 largest shareholders. Similarly, 
corporate ownership is measured as the ratio of shareholdings by corporate investors that are among a 
firm’s 10 largest shareholders. Individual ownership is defined by the ratio of shareholdings by 
individuals who are among a firm’s 10 largest shareholders, and foreign ownership is measured as the 
ratio of shareholdings by foreign investors who are among a firm’s 10 largest shareholders. We use the 
aggregated ratio of the firm’s 10 largest shareholders to measure the ownership structure of Japanese 
firms, as we expect that these investors are likely to be influential.  
Our sample consists of all publicly listed nonfinancial firms in Japan for the period from 1962 to 2012. 
The original sample size of this study is 5,022 firms, while the number of listed firms varies each year due 
to new listings, delisting, mergers, and bankruptcy.  
 
2.3. The history of the stock market in Japan  
Figure 2.1 shows the number of IPO firms by year from 1949 to 2012. We can see that three major events 
took place during the period from 1949 to 2012.  
 
                                                          
1 DBJ database basically covers whole listed nonfinancial corporations in Japan. One limitation of this database is 
that it does not cover corporations that were delisted before 1980. Though we do not have the list of corporations 
delisted from 1949 to 1980, we suppose the delisting ratio is not high in Japan during this period. Thus, we suppose 
our sample is close to the population base of listed corporations in Japan.  
 
2 The Center for Economic Institutions at the Hitotsubashi University developed its ownership (covering 1950–
1983) and board (covering 1962–1988) databases for all Japanese listed firms available to researchers. 
http://cei.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/Japanese/publication/database2.html  
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Figure 2.1 Number of IPO firms by year (1949–2012). 
 
 
The Japanese stock market reopened in 1949 after World War II, and more than 700 firms went public in 
that year. The second section of the stock market started in 1961, and during 1961 to 1964 about 700 
firms went public. There were no major IPO events and no new momentum on IPOs in the Japanese stock 
market from 1965 until 1987. This suggests that the IPO firms that went public from 1949 to 1964 were 
the main players in the postwar Japanese economy. Some prior studies focus on these firms and reveal 
that stable shareholding and cross-shareholding were typical ownership structures of Japanese firms and 
that the main bank system functioned as the corporate governance system in Japan (Berglof and Perotti, 
1994; Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1990; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Morck and Nakamura, 1999; 
Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani, 2000). Around 1988, the new stock market (JASDAQ) became active, 
and 115 IPO events occurred on average from 1988 to 2012.  
We argue that IPO firms that went public from 1949 to 1960 (we call this “Group 1” throughout this 
chapter) and IPO firms that went public from 1961 to 1964 have totally different firm characteristics, 
including the ownership trait. We believe that this is an important perspective when we analyze the 
Japanese firm system in evolution.  
The General Headquarters (GHQ) dissolved the prewar ownership structure of the major Japanese firms 
run by zaibatsu-related firms and excluded zaibatsu-related persons from management positions after the 
World War II. This means that Group 1 firms’ ownership structure was dissolved by an outside force, and 
this policy was the external shock faced by Group 1 firms. On the other hand, IPO firms that went public 
from 1961 to 1964 did not experience this sort of external shock, and, thus, we argue that these two 
groups have different firm characteristics, including ownership structure. We show the key differences in 
firm characteristic between these two groups in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the IPO firms that went public from 1949 to 1960 and the IPO 
firms that went public from 1961 to 1964, as well as the results of the mean comparison test. The mean 
value of each group is the average of the variable during 1962 to 1970. *** indicates that the mean 
difference between two groups is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
Firm size is measured as the log value of total assets. Firm age is calculated from the establishment year. 
The total debt ratio is measured as the ratio of total debts to total assets. Long-term debt ratio is measured 
as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, and short-term debt ratio is measured as the ratio of short-
term debt to total assets. ROA is measured as the operating income divided by the book value of total 
assets. The sales growth is measured as the annual nominal growth ratio of sales. Ownership 
concentration is defined as the sum of shareholding among the 10 largest shareholders.  
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As is clear from Table 2.1, two groups have totally different firm characteristics and ownership traits. The 
IPO firms that went public from 1949 to 1960 are larger and older, and they have stronger relationships 
with the banking sector than the IPO firms that went public from 1961 to 1964, but firm performance 
(measured by ROA and sales growth) of the former group is weaker than that of the latter group. We will 
touch on the ownership difference later. Thus, we argue that these differences are critical to better 
understand the Japanese firm system in evolution by comparing the IPO firms that went public from 1949 
to 1960 and the IPO firms that went public from 1961 to 1964 as they have totally different firm 
characteristics including their ownership traits.  
 
Table 2.1 Comparison of firm traits between two groups  
  
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. The column difference means the value of 1949 < IPO < 
1960 group minus the value of 1961 < IPO < 1964 group. T value indicates the result of T-statistics mean 
comparison test between two groups.  
 
 
2.4. Evolution in the ownership concentration  
As Figure 2.1 shows, the IPO distribution was not smooth from period to period. We classify IPO firms 
that went public from 1949 to 1960 in Group 1 (994 firms). This group represents the prewar zaibatsu-
related firms and postwar keiretsu-related firms. We classify IPO firms that went public from 1961 to 
1987 into Group 2 (1,294 firms). This group represents smaller and newer non-prewar zaibatsu-related 
firms.3 We classify IPO firms that went public from 1988 to 2008 into Group 3 (2,734 firms).  
Figure 2.2 provides the average ownership concentration level of all the sample firms and that of each of 
the three subgroups by IPO year, not by fiscal year.4 The full sample trend shows that the ownership 
concentration among largest 10 shareholders has been decreasing through the firm survival and growth. 
Surprisingly, if we divide the full sample into subgroups, we could find a different story. Figure 2.2 
shows that Group 2 and Group 3 follow the same pattern as the entire sample firms, yet Group 1 does not. 
The ownership concentration level of Group 1 was increasing until IPO year 24 (around 1973 fiscal year). 
Thus, Group 1 has quite different ownership characteristics compared to Groups 2 and 3. As discussed in 
                                                          
3 If we apply the family firm perspective to this group, then 60 percent of the firms are the case. We do not touch on 
the family firm issue in this chapter as this issue is beyond our scope. 
4 The average value of ownership concentration for Group 1 begins from IPO year 2 due to data availability. 
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the previous section, this difference largely comes from the GHQ policy. Thus, it is important to note that, 
although there were many IPO events from 1949 to 1964 (just 15 years), the IPO firms that went public 
from 1949 to 1960 and the IPO firms that went public from 1961 to 1964 have different ownership traits 
and evolution pattern.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Ownership concentration evolution (among top 10, by IPO year). 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Ownership concentration evolution (among top 10, by fiscal year). 
 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the average ownership concentration level of the entire sample and each of the three 
subgroups by fiscal year. These figures reconfirm the story shown in Figure 2.2. To summarize this 
section, Group 1 and Group 2 have different ownership characteristics, which is largely driven by the 
GHQ policy. It is important to take this difference into consideration when we analyze the evolution of 
the Japanese firm system.  
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2.5. Ownership evolution  
 
As mentioned in the sample section, we classify the 10 largest shareholders into 10 categories: bank, 
insurance, securities, corporate, other financial company (including venture capital), individual, employee 
stock ownership plan (ESOP), foreign investor, foundation, and others. Among these 10 categories, we 
focus on bank, insurance, securities, corporate, individual, and foreign investors because these owners are 
the main players in Japan. We combine bank, insurance, and securities into one category and call this 
“financial ownership.” Thus, main category for this section consists of financial, corporate, individual, 
and foreign investors.  
Figure 2.4 provides the average ownership levels for four categories for the Group 1 firms during 1962 to 
2012. Although financial ownership shows some fluctuations, it was an upward trend from 1962 to 1990, 
and it was a downward trend from 1991 to 2012. The financial ownership level in 2012 is smaller than 
that in 1962 by 5.33 percent. The corporate ownership went up rapidly from 13 percent to 19 percent 
during 1962 to 1973, showed stable movement thereafter, and then showed up-and-down movement from 
2002 to 2012. In addition, financial ownership was always higher than corporate ownership throughout 
our sample periods (1962–2012). Thus, in terms of ownership ratio, financial owners have been the most 
powerful players as a large shareholder in Group 1. Individual ownership is not the main part in Group 1. 
Average foreign ownership during 1962 to 1995 was 1.08 percent, but the average foreign ownership 
from 1996 to 2012 was 2.40 percent. This indicates that the presence of foreign investors in Japan has 
increased quite recently.  
Previous research on ownership structure in Japan mainly focuses on stable shareholders and cross-
shareholdings. The keiretsu system, or main bank system, is also closely related to the ownership 
characteristics of the Japanese firm. The main story is that, after many firms went back to the stock 
market in 1949, they had to resort to stable shareholding arrangements due to GHQ policy. There were 
several hostile takeovers during the 1950s, and prewar zaibatsu-related firms (the main part of Group 1) 
tried to utilize stable shareholdings to defend themselves against such market pressure. As the maximum 
bank ownership per each firm was 5 percent due to regulation and thus the prewar zaibatsu firms could 
not count on banks alone to hold their shares, they attempted to establish stable shareholdings through 
other prewar zaibatsu-related firms. Figure 2.4 displays this story well. In summary, Group 1 is the 
representative of the traditional Japanese firm system that is based on the main bank, or keiretsu system 
and stable shareholdings in postwar Japan.  
 
 
Figure 2.4 Group 1 ownership evolution (among top 10, by fiscal year). 
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Figure 2.5 provides the average ownership level for four categories of the Group 2 firms during 1962 to 
2012. Figure 2.5 indicates that ownership structure and evolution of Group 2 are totally different from 
those of Group 1. In the initial stage of IPO (during 1962 to 1966), the main shareholder was the 
individual. Individual ownership declined following firm growth and survival. The corporate ownership 
trend is very similar to that of Group 1. Until 1973, corporate ownership was increasing rapidly, and it 
showed stable movement after that. Corporate ownership was higher than financial ownership throughout 
the period from 1962 to 2012, which is quite the opposite of the Group 1. Financial ownership evolution 
is similar to Group 1. From 1962 to 1990, financial ownership increased from 8 percent to 19 percent and 
decreased slowly from 1991 to 2012. The foreign ownership trend was also very similar to that of Group 
1.  
Figure 2.6 provides the average ownership level for four categories of Group 3 firms during 1991 to 2012. 
The trend in this period was similar to that of Group 2 firms. In terms of ownership ratio, corporate 
owners have been the most powerful players as the large shareholder in Group 3.  
 
 
Figure 2.5 Group 2 ownership evolution (among top 10, by fiscal year). 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Group 3 ownership evolution (among top 10, by fiscal year). 
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To summarize this section, Group 1 and Group 2 firms have very different ownership characteristics and 
evolution over time. Most Group 1 firms were operating during the war, were temporarily delisted due to 
the stock market closure, and then went public again when the stock market was reopened in 1949. This 
implies that they already had business resources and established business networks and relationships 
when they went public in 1949. Especially, they had close relationships with the financial sector, 
including banks, insurance, and securities from the initial stage of IPOs. This fact is reflected in Group 1 
firms’ ownership structure; the main shareholders of Group 1 in the early stage of the IPO were financial 
institutions. In contrast to Group 1, financial ownership was not the main player in Group 2 firms in the 
early stages of their IPO, but rather individual ownership was the main one. This indicates that most of 
Group 2 firms likely did not have strong relationships with the financial sectors as these firms were newly 
established. Thus, the conventional model of the Japanese firm system established through keiretsu 
formation, or the main bank system formation, or cross-shareholding or stable shareholding is applicable 
only to Group 1 firms. This is the key message from our analysis. We should therefore distinguish Group 
1 and Group 2 firms when we investigate the Japanese firm system in evolution.  
 
 
2.6. Economic shock and corporate governance perspectives  
 
Ownership structure is one of the main corporate governance mechanisms. Under the assumption of the 
separation of ownership and control, the firm needs to have some mechanism to monitor the managerial 
discretion. The financial market is expected to play this role through M&As (the market for corporate 
control) in the United States as an outside pressure to the firm. The managerial compensation package and 
outside board of directors are also expected to play this role as an internal mechanism in U.S. firms.  
Unlike in the United States, there was not much M&A activity, especially hostile takeovers, in Japan until 
1990. Most M&As until 1990 were for the purpose of rescuing underperforming firms. Japanese boards 
have been dominated by insider executives because a board position is often perceived as the highest rank 
that employees can aspire to reach after their long service to the firm (Charkham, 1994). As there was no 
formal requirement to have outside directors until quite recently, the number of outside directors on many 
Japanese boards has been rather small, and those directors were usually affiliated rather than independent 
outsiders (Miwa and Ramseyer, 2005). In most cases, outside directorships have been used to cement 
business relationships and to monitor management on behalf of affiliated firms that often hold 
shareholdings in the focal firm as strategic owners (David et al., 2010). In addition, stock option 
compensation was not legal in Japan before 1997. Thus, the managerial compensation package and 
outside board of directors were not the main corporate governance mechanisms in Japanese firms.  
Previous research shows that the bank has been playing a main corporate governance role in Japan. This 
system is called the “main bank system” or “bank-centered financial system.” Most firms borrow money 
from banks, and many banks also hold shares of firms to which they provide loans. Thus, the Japanese 
bank has a strong information advantage over its borrower firms. Using this advantage, they are expected 
to play a corporate governance role.  
In this section, we investigate the ownership evolution from a corporate governance perspective and 
examine the impacts of the major external (both global and domestic) shocks that may have driven 
significant changes in ownership structure and thus corporate governance. Figure 2.7 provides the average 
bank ownership for our three groups during 1962 to 2012.  
While there are some variations and fluctuations by group and time span, we could interpret that bank 
ownership shows an increasing trend from 1962 to 1990 and a decreasing trend from 1991 to 2012. What 
happened in Japan in 1990? There was bubble burst in 1990, which was a turning point to the bank 
ownership and corporate governance system in Japan. Both Group 1 and Group 2 firms had a strong 
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relationship with the banking sector until 1990. This was especially true for Group 2 firms even though 
this group had no strong relationship with this sector around the early stage of their IPOs. The bank 
ownership rapidly increased from 1962 to 1972 (from 2.7 percent to 7.9 percent) in Group 2 firms and 
also it kept an increasing trend from 1973 to 1990.  
 
 
Figure 2.7 Bank ownership evolution (among top 10, by fiscal year). 
 
 
This close relationship with the banking sector was strongly influenced by the bubble burst, with which 
the banking sector was facing a difficult situation. The banks themselves had poor BIS (Bank for 
International Settlements) ratios due to this shock. With several firms experiencing severe performance 
trouble, the banks, as their main banks, needed to rescue them. This effect did not show up suddenly, but 
it came like constant body blows to the Japanese banks. Its effect was ultimately shown in the 
bankruptcies of Yamaichi Securities and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in 1997. This is reflected in Figure 
2.7, which shows that bank ownership decreased rapidly from 1996 to 1999.  
The Japanese government attempted to make changes to the financial sector framework, such as by 
orchestrating banks to merge with one another. The government called this policy a “Financial Big 
Bang,” which was introduced around 2000. As a result of this policy, the number of major commercial 
banks was reduced from 17 to just 4. In addition, the maximum shares that a bank can hold was capped at 
5 percent by the regulation. This indicates that the Financial Big Bang had significant effects on bank 
ownership, although Figure 2.7 does not show such an effect.  
We argue that this phenomenon was due to the entry of newly established trust banks. The Master Trust 
Bank of Japan, Ltd and Japan Trustee Services Bank, Ltd show their names among the 10 largest 
shareholders in many Japanese firms after 2000. The 5 percent regulation does not apply to trust banks, 
and these two banks may hold more than 5 percent of a firm’s stock. We suspect that these two trust 
banks have a mitigating role in the Financial Big Bang effect on bank ownership. We will show this issue 
in the Appendix to this chapter in more detail.  
In summary, bank ownership increased from 1962 to 1990 for both Group 1 and Group 2 firms, 
suggesting that the banking sector had gained strong power over Japanese firms and had a critical role to 
play in the corporate governance system. This situation has, however changed due to the bubble burst and 
the Japanese Financial Big Bang. Thus, the banking sector lost its power to monitor their borrower firms 
slowly from 1991 to 1999 and especially after the Financial Big Bang in 2000.  
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Figure 2.8 provides the average corporate ownership by our three groups during the period 1962 to 2012. 
The evolution of corporate ownership shows very similar trends for Group 1 and Group 2 firms. 
Corporate ownership rapidly increased from 1962 to 1973 and then shows a slight downward trend from 
1973 to 2000, with ownership level fluctuating from 2001 to 2012. We can thus classify our entire sample 
period in the three periods for corporate ownership. The first is the rapid growth period, or rapid business 
relationship formation period (1962–1972). The second is the stable period, or stable business relationship 
period (1973–2000). The last is the fluctuation period, or new business relationship formation period 
(2001–2012). We have shown that Groups 1 and 2 firms have different ownership characteristics and 
evolution in the previous section. However, the trend of corporate ownership is very similar between 
these two groups. This implies that some common factor likely affected this movement.  
Figure 2.8 tells us that the banking side shock indirectly affected corporate ownership. The Japanese firm 
system has been supported and monitored through the banking sector, strongly in Group 1 and moderately 
in Group 2. Thus, restructuring in the banking sector likely affected the Japanese firm system.5 Corporate 
ownership in both Group 1 and Group 2 shows some variations and fluctuations from 2001 to 2012.  
 
 
Figure 2.8 Corporate ownership evolution (among top 10, by fiscal year).  
 
In summary, corporate ownership change represents the rapid business relationship formation period 
(1962–1972), stable business relationship period (1973–2000), and new business relationship formation 
period (2001–2012). In addition, corporate ownership evolution is strongly affected by the banking sector, 
especially after the Financial Big Bang.  
 
Figure 2.9 provides the average foreign ownership by our three groups during the period 1962 to 2012. 
Foreign owners were not main players among the largest 10 shareholders from 1962 to 1998 in Japan. 
This trend started to change around 1998, and foreign ownership kept increasing after 1998 for both 
Group 1 and Group 2. This trend also applies to the Group 3 firms. The average foreign ownership was 
2.87 for Group 1 and 3.22 for Group 2 and 3.27 for Group 3 in 2012. We expect this upward trend will 
likely continue and that foreign owners will be the main player as a large shareholder and activist in Japan 
in the future (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005; Colpan and Yoshikawa, 2012). We provide more fine-
grained statistics for foreign ownership in Table A2.3 in the Appendix.  
                                                          
5 We provide the number of delisted firms during 1981 to 2010 in the appendix. This figure supports our argument 
in this section. 
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To summarize this section, the Japanese corporate governance system started to change sometime after 
the bubble burst. The banking sector was damaged slowly by the bubble burst, and this system was 
drastically changed around 2000 when the government implemented the so-called Financial Big Bang. 
After 2000, the governance role of the banking sector has been severely reduced. From 2000 to 2012, 
corporate relationships also changed due to the Financial Big Bang effect. After 1998, foreign ownership 
started to increase, and we believe that foreign investors have an important role as activist investors in 
Japan. This is the summary of the reinterpretation of Japanese firm ownership evolution from the 
corporate governance perspective.  
 
 
Figure 2.9 Foreign ownership evolution (among top 10, by fiscal year).  
 
2.7. Concluding remarks  
 
In this chapter, we investigated the evolution of ownership structure and corporate governance in 
Japanese firms based on analyses using the entire population of listed firms from 1962 to 2012. We find 
that the IPO firms that went public from 1949 to 1960 (Group 1 firms) and the IPO firms that went public 
from 1961 to 1964 have totally different firm characteristics, including the ownership pattern. We argue 
that this is a new and important perspective that provides an interesting insight in deepening our 
understanding of the Japanese firm system in evolution.  
We also investigated the impacts of the major external (both global and domestic) shocks that may have 
driven significant changes in ownership structure and corporate governance. We find that the Japanese 
firm system has a functional corporate governance mechanism from 1973 to 1990, but this system started 
to change sometime after the bubble burst and was further challenged due to the Financial Big Bang.  
We believe that there are still several unanswered questions, and we expect that future work will handle 
these issues. First of all, are the two major trust banks, The Master Trust Bank of Japan, Ltd and Japan 
Trustee Services Bank, Ltd, activist or not? These two trust banks replaced some bank shareholdings, but 
there is no research to show the role of these two trust banks. We believe that this is an interesting 
research question.  
Secondly, the business relationship has also changed after the Financial Big Bang. We sometimes hear 
that there are no longer keiretsu relationships in Japan after 2000. Is this true? What is the difference 
between pre–Financial Big Bang corporate relationships and post–Financial Big Bang corporate 
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relationships? What factor affects these business relationships between the different periods? Although 
more than 10 years have passed since the Financial Big Bang, no research addresses this question.  
Thirdly, the foreign ownership effect appears in all three categories. Group 3 consists of mostly new IPO 
firms, and hence those firms still do not have much reputation and are not well-known. Yet foreign 
owners are also investing in this group. Thus, it would be interesting to look into factors that are driving 
foreign owners’ investment behavior and the implications of their shareholdings in those smaller firms.  
Lastly, corporate governance in family firms is also a promising area, as many family firms are in Group 
2 and Group 3. Though the family firm is a hot topic in recent years, there is not much research regarding 
the family firm and corporate governance issue from a broader perspective and especially in the Japanese 
context.  
In addition, Japan provides an interesting research setting for the family firm topic. We identify two peaks 
of IPOs in 1949 and 1961. After their closure during the war and the postwar confusion, the stock 
exchanges reopened in 1949, and the prewar listed zaibatsu-related firms appeared once again at that 
time. Most of them were non–family firms due to GHQ policy. However, after the opening of the second 
section of the Stock Exchange in 1961, numerous relatively small and young firms went public until 
1964. Family firms comprised the majority (approximately 60 percent) of the IPO firms from 1961 to 
1964. Thus, Japanese listed firms provide quite an interesting data set for research on family firms, with 
regard to the number and share of family firms.  
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Appendix  
In this Appendix, we provide several supporting results for our discussion in this chapter. First, we 
provide the summary of DID (difference-in-difference) analysis to show the impact of major external 
shocks to the ownership structure change in Japan. Table A2.1 provides this result. We focus on four 
major shocks: the Oil shock (1973), the Bubble shock (1990), the Financial Big Bang (2000), and the 
Lehman shock (2008). We calculate four ownership structures: bank ownership, corporate ownership, 
individual ownership, and foreign ownership as we saw in Section 2.6.  
The column named “Difference” is the average difference between comparison groups (in our case, 
Groups 1 and 2) before and after the event. The row “Difference” is the average difference between pre- 
and post-events within each group, and this is what we want to see. We calculate the average value for 
five years before and after the event for comparison.  
Bank ownership increases by about 1.7 percent around the time of the Oil shock (average value of five 
years after the shock minus the corresponding value before the shock) in Group 1, and this is statistically 
significant at the 0.1 percent level. The corresponding value for Group 2 increases by about 3.1 percent 
around the event, and this is also statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level. The DID result shows 
that the difference between the changes in bank ownership in Groups 1 and 2 is about 1.4 percent and is 
statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level. Thus, we find that in both groups, bank ownership is 
increased around the Oil shock, while bank ownership in Group 2 firms increased more rapidly around 
the event than that in Group 1 firms. This is consistent with Figure 2.7.  
Table A2.1 also shows that corporate ownership in both groups increased around the Oil shock, but the 
DID result in corporate ownership shows no difference between the two groups. This result also supports 
our findings in Figure 2.8. Individual ownership in both groups decreased around the Oil shock, and this 
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effect for Group 2 is larger than that for Group 1. This is also consistent with the previous section’s 
findings. No major change in foreign ownership took place for the two groups around the Oil shock.  
The Bubble shock shows the similar trend to that of the Oil shock. Changes in individual ownership and 
foreign ownership around the event are the same as the case for the Oil shock. Bank ownership change is 
similar to the result of the Oil shock, but the impact on bank ownership in Group 1 is larger than that in 
Group 2. Corporate ownership in Group 1 did not change around the event but in Group 2 increased 
around the bubble burst.  
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The Financial Big Bang shock shows a different pattern from that of the bubble burst. Bank ownership in 
Group 2 decreased around 2000. Surprisingly, bank ownership in Group 1 increased around the Financial 
Big Bang event. We suspect that the two newly established trust banks have a critical role for Group 1 
firms, and Figure A2.1 supports this. The value of two trust bank ownership in Group 1 firms increased 
rapidly from 2000 to 2003. Corporate ownership in the both groups decreased around 2000, and this 
indicates that the Financial Big Bang also affected the Japanese interfirm relationships. Individual 
ownership in two groups did not show any major change around the 2000. Foreign ownership in the both 
groups increased around 2000. However, the DID result on foreign ownership indicates no difference 
between the two groups. This result also supports our findings.  
 
 
 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2.1 Presence of two trust banks: (a) percentage of firms that do not have two trust banks as the 
large shareholder; (b) two trust bank ownership.  
 
Bank ownership in the both groups decreased around the Lehman shock, but the DID result on bank 
ownership shows no difference between the two groups. Nothing has changed occurs to the Corporate 
ownership in the two groups and showed no major change around in 2008. In sum, Table A2.1 strongly 
supports our findings.  
Second, Table A2.2 provides the number of delisted firms from 1981 to 2010. The total number of 
delisted firms in the 1980s was 54, while that of delisted firms in the 1990s was 271, and that of delisted 
firms in the 2000s was 1,068. This information supports our discussion on corporate relationships and 
corporate ownership evolution.  
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Year  The number of delisted firms  
1981    5  
1982    13  
1983    8  
1984    4  
1985    7  
1986    4  
1987    2  
1988    2  
1989    4  
1990    5  
Sum of 1980s    54  
1991    12  
1992    9  
1993    9  
1994    14  
1995    11  
1996    19  
1997    33  
1998    40  
1999    53  
2000    71  
Sum of 1990s   271  
2001    91  
2002   115  
2003    70  
2004   103  
2005    72  
2006   122  
2007   148  
2008   129  
2009   115  
2010   103  
Sum of 2000s   1068  
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The main message for the corporate ownership evolution is that Japanese firms had stable corporate 
ownership until 1990, but the pattern started to change sometime after the bubble burst and drastically 
changed around 2000 when the government implemented the Financial Big Bang. From 2000 to 2012, 
corporate relationships show significant changes due to the Financial Big Bang.  
Table A2.2 reflects this point well. The number of delisted firms was very low during the 1980s, 
indicating that the Japanese firm system had a stable environment during this period. The number of 
delisted firms during the 1990s was five times larger than that of delisted firms during the 1980s. This 
indicates that the bubble burst shock affected the Japanese firm system’s stability. Surprisingly, the 
number of delisted firms during the 2000s was four times larger than that of delisted firms during the 
1990s, and more than 1,000 firms were delisted during the 2000s. This shows that the Financial Big Bang 
imposed a significant impact on the Japanese firm relationships and stability through the banking sector 
restructuring.  
Third, we show the impact of the newly established two trust bank (The Master Trust Bank of Japan, Ltd 
and Japan Trustee Services Bank, Ltd) on the ownership structure of Japanese firms in Figure A2.1. The 
average shareholding of these two trust banks among the largest 10 shareholders was zero until 1999 and 
has begun to show positive values from 2000 (Financial Big Bang). The positive value increased rapidly 
from 2000 to 2003 and became stable during the period 2004 to 2012, although there was some 
fluctuation due to the Lehman shock effect. The average of the whole sample during the period 2003 to 
2012 was 4.3 percent; that of Group 1 was 8.1 percent, while that of Group 2 was 5.2 percent and Group 3 
was 3.0 percent.  
This figure clearly shows that these two trust banks mitigated the impact of the Financial Big Bang on the 
ownership structure of Japanese firms. The number of major commercial bank is reduced from 17 to 4 
due to the Financial Big Bang, and this implies the huge decline of bank ownership as the bank’s 
maximum shareholding is 5 percent due to regulation. As we see in Figure 2.7, this phenomenon does not 
appear, and Figure A2.1 shows the mitigating effect of the newly established two trust banks. In addition, 
the moderating effect shows the strength ordering from Group 1 to Group 3, as we expected.  
The upper panel of Figure A2.1 also supports our argument. This figure reveals the number of firms that 
do not have any relationship with these two trust banks as their largest 10 shareholders. The average value 
of the entire sample during the period 2003 to 2012 was 44.5 percent; while that of Group 1 was 17.0 
percent, that of Group 2 was 37.1 percent, and that of Group 3 was 54.0 percent. These results also 
indicate that these two trust banks have a major role as a large shareholder after the Financial Big Bang in 
Japan.  
Lastly, we provide the information about the industry distribution of foreign ownership. We calculate the 
average value of foreign ownership during the period 1990–1996 and during the period 1997–2012 by 
industry. Industry classification follows the two-digit classification. The rank follows the average value 
during the period 1997 and 2012. See Table A2.3.  
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Table A2.3 Foreign investors and industry 
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